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NOTES
of transactions. Courts have been responsive to the need for expanding
the framework of the Sales Act warranties; the need for a similar ap-
proach in areas other than sales should not be overlooked.
THE 'RIGHT' TO OBSERVE TRIALS-ITS SOURCE AND
VINDICATION
Open trial is a well established feature of the Anglo-American
judicial process. Few will dispute its desirability in a free society.' Open
trial has been expressly recognized as a right of an accused in the Sixth
Amendment and in state constitutions and statutes.2 But a similar right
of the public has had no express recognition.' For many centuries, in
England and the United States, the public has attended trials, both civil
and criminal; but it is not clear whether the public has a right to at-
tend trials or whether public attendance is merely a way of vindicating
the right of the accused."
1. A federal court recently named the supposed justifications for the right as: (1) a
safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution; (2)
notice to witnesses who may then voluntarily come forward with valuable evidence;
and (3) confidence in judicial remedies instilled in spectators gained through observation
of their government in action. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The first justification
may be attributed to the traditional Anglo-Saxon distrust of secret trials ascribed to the
Spanish Inquisition, the English Court of the Star Chamber, and to the French Mon-
archy's abuse of lettre de cachet. The second may be attributed to the ancient common
law concept of public trials and its particular merits in reference to the quality and
quantity of testimony given at the trial. This benefit accruing to the testimonial process
relates to civil as well as criminal trials while the first justification seems peculiar to
the criminal process. The third justification emphasized by the federal court seems to be
an outgrowth of the concept of popular sovereignty and the right of the people to partici-
pate in the governmental process.
2. The constitutions of 41 states guarantee a public trial to the accused in criminal
cases. For a list of the states, see Note, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 395 n. 8 (1950). Two states,
New York and Nevada, provide a statutory guarantee: N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 12;
Nav. Comp. LAws § 10654 (1929).
3. The nearest thing to an express recognition similar to the right of the accused
is the Michigan and New York statutory provisions: "The sittings of every court within
this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, . . ." N.Y.
JuDIcIARY LAW § 4; MICH. JUDICATURE Act c. 4, § 604.5. But the N.Y. Court of
Appeals, in United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954), in-
terpreted the provision as not establishing an enforcible right in the public.
The Ohio Court of Appeals construed a more general provision as extending a distinct
right in the public to an open trial. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
Art. I, § 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law. .. ."
4. "The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence
of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The practice of holding open trials existed in English legal pro-
cedure at least two centuries before the United States Constitution was
adopted, but the reasons underlying the practice and the protection gained
thereby are not well documented.5 Early English writers stressed the
value of publicity as tending to improve the quality and increase the
quantity of testimony.6 It is doubtful that these justifications were made
and to the importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly observed if,
without partiality or favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to
attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence could be of no service to the
accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity, are excluded
altogether." 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927). At least one
court has indicated that the guarantee of public trial in the state constitution is intended
to protect the public as well as the accused. State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080
(1916). "Primarily it is for the benefit of the accused. . . . But it likewise involves
questions of public interest and concern. The people are interested in knowing, and have
the right to know, how their servants-the judge, county attorney, sheriff, and clerk-
conduct public's business. . . . But the public is interested in every criminal trial that
court officers and jurors are kept keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and the
importance of their functions, and interested spectators by their presence are the most
potent influence to accomplish this desired end." Id. at 218; 156 P. at 1083.
For a discussion of the common law practice, see generally: HALE, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (Runnington ed. 1820); 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
372 (Lewis's ed. 1900); MAITLAND AND MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 56 (1915) ; JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 91 (3d ed. 1932) ; 6 BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICAL EVIDENCE 355 (Bowring's ed. 1843); 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 156 (3d ed. 1945); 2 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 957-959
(2d ed. 1913) ; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940); Radin, The Right to a
Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932). As to open trial practice in Roman and other
civilized societies of earlier times, see JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTON TO ROMAN
LAW 318-27, 407-09 (1932).
5. Sir Thomas Smith's De Republica Anglorum, written in 1565, is one of the
first writings of English legal history which makes a particular point of the public
character of English trials. In his comments on the jury, he states: "Evidences of
writinges be shewed, witnesses be sworne and heard before them not after the fashion
of the civill law but openly, that not only xii [the jury], the Judges, the parties and as
many as be present may heare what ech witnesse doeth say. . . . All the rest is doone
openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner and so
manic as will or can come so neare as to heare it." Quoted in Radin, supra note 4 at 382.
6. "[T]he excellency of this Open course of evidence to the jury, in presence of the
judge, jury, parties and counsel, and even of the adverse witnesses, appears in these
particulars. 1st. That it is openly, and not in private before a commissioner or two, and
a couple of clerks; where, oftentimes witnesses will deliver that which they will be
ashamed to testify publickly." HALE, op. cit. supra note 4 at 345.
In 1768, Blackstone stated that "The open examination of witnesses Viva voce, in
the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth than
the private and secret examination before an officer or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical
courts and all that have borrowed their procedure from the civil law: where a witness
may frequently depose that in private which he will be shamed to testify in a public
and solemn tribunal. There an artful or careless scribe may make a witness speak what
he never meant, by dressing up his depositions in his own forms and language; but he is
here at liberty to correct and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which he can never
do after a written deposition is once taken." BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra.note 4 at 373.
In 1823, Bentham wrote: "The advantages of publicity are neither inconsiderable
deponent. . . . In many cases, . . . the publicity of the examination or deposition oper-
ates as a check upon mendacity and incorrectness. However sure he may think himself of
out of solicitude for the accused; it is more likely that the writers were
concerned with jury trial and its effectiveness as a process for ascertain-
ing truth.7 The fact that open trial was practiced in civil as well as crim-
inal cases lends further support to this assertion.' It is also conceivable
that these supposed merits were mere justifications for the retention of
the custom of the community.
Open trials were a necessary incident to the jury system as it existed
in Roman law and in early Anglo-Saxon practice. The theory behind
the creation of 'the jury system was to leave the decision of the case to
interested persons, preferably those familiar with the matter in dis-
pute. The local community as a whole was charged with responsibility' for
apprehending criminals and was subject to assessment of damages for
permitting a crime to occur in its locale. With significant changes in
social conditions, community responsibility for the apprehension of
criminals was transformed into a governmental function. The duty of the
jury changed from that of reporting to judging facts, and the principal
qualification for a juror became impartiality.9 While incidental benefit
to the testimonial process accrued from publicity, it is probable that
the practice of open trials was retained as a matter of form more than
of substance.
Although open trial was inherited from Anglo-Saxon procedure,
it does not follow that the basis for open trial in the United States is a
mere codification of the common law practice and purpose." The ex-
not being contradicted by the deposition of any percipient witness, the prudence or impru-
dence, the probity or improbity, of that one original witness may have given birth to deriva-
tive and extrajudicial testimonies in any number. Environed as he sees himself by a thou-
sand eyes, contradiction, should be hazard a false tale, will seem ready to rise up in opposi-
tion to it from a thousand mouths. Many a known face, and every unknown countenance,
presents to him a possible source of detection, from whence the truth he is struggling
to suppress may through some unsuspected channel burst forth to his confusion . . .
Another advantage of this publicity . . . is the chance it affords to justice of receiving,
from hands individually unknown, ulterior evidence, for the supply of any deficiency or
confutation of any falsehood, which inadvertency or mendacity may have left or intro-
duced." BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 4 at 355.
7. In the statements of Hale and Blackstone quoted in note 6, supra, it is important
to note that they are speaking of publicity as related to the jury system and the open
examination of witnesses as a part of the system. Blackstone makes a comparison
between the open examination of witnesses viva voce and the taking of testimony by
depositions and written interrogatories and concludes that the former is much more
conducive to the clearing up of truth.
8. See, for instance, the statement of Sir John Hawles quoted in note 40, infra.
9. For a discussion of the early history of the jury system, see BLACKSTONE, op. Cit.
supra note 4, c. XXIII; MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, 20-23 (1952) ; Garret, Public Trials, 62 AM. L.R. 1 (1928).
10. "[Tihe common law cannot be admitted as the universal expositor of American
terms. . . . The freedom of conscience and of religion are found in the same instruments
which assert the freedom of the press. It will never be admitted that the meaning of the
former, in the common law of England, is to limit their meaning in the United States."
NOTES 379
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perience of secret trials motivated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
open trial to an accused. It is also probable that open trial reflected a new
idea of government and its relationship to the individual.
This nation is not a pure democracy but a government by represen-
tatives of the people. To retain their sovereignty and control, the people
have defined the authority of their representatives in the Constitution.1
Their dependence upon the judicial process to check abuses of this
authority and to preserve sovereign rights against encroachment makes
it essential that people know whether the judiciary is fulfilling its obliga-
tions."
6 WRITINGS OF MADISON 386 (1906).
In the words of Mr. Justice Black: "For, the argument runs, the power of judges
to punish by contempt out-of-court publications tending to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice in a pending case was deeply rooted in English common law
at the time the Constitution was adopted. That this historical contention is dubious has
been persuasively argued elsewhere. . . . In any event it need not detain us, for to
assume that English common law in this field became ours is to deny the generally
accepted historical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the
English common law on liberty of speech and of the press.'" Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1941).
11. VALE, SOME LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY 536-37 (1941). The author states
that a written instrument was necessary because "the people of America are without the
limitations of custom and of tradition, which among older nations may be sufficient
to restrain power." Ibid.
12. Professor Hall points out that consent of the governed in a democracy means
. chiefly, the privilege of all normal adults to vote, the free expression of ideas,
and the responsibility of the government to the governed. It implied not mere approval
or acquiescence but active participation in the processes of governmnent. It implies such a
relationship between citizens and officials that the will of the former is necessary to
the right of the latter to officiate, i.e., the officials are the agents of the citizens. It
means that each person shall potentially have an equal participation in the control of
government, with all that that implies for the determination of questions of public
policy, law-making, and law enforcing . . . in short, in a democratic society, 'consent
of the governed' means self-rule." HALL, LIVING LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 88, 89
(1949) (emphasis added).
In comparing freedom of the press under the First Amendment with that under the
English constitutional law, Madison concluded that the First Amendment guarantees a
much broader freedom than existed in England at the time. He observes that the standard
of "previous restraint" established by the English courts cannot be accepted as the only
restriction under the First Amendment, "since a law inflicting penalties on printed
publications would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on
them." MADISON, op. cit. supra note 9 at 386. Herein lies the explanation for the differ-
ence in the contempt powers of the English and the American courts as related to sup-
pression of publication. Madison bases the difference on the fact that in England Parlia-
ment is omnipotent, while in the United States the people retain absolute sovereignty.
"Hence, in the United States the great and essential rights of the people are secured
against legislative as well as against executive ambition." Ibid.
Thomas Jefferson said: "The basis of our governments being the opinion of the
people, the very first object should be to keep that right. The way to prevent [errors
of] ...the people, is to give them full information of their affairs through the channel
of the public papers, and to contrive that these papers should penetrate the whole mass
of the people." See LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 62 (1950).
"If government is the instrument which they (the people) adopted for the promotion
of general good; if it is the creature which they invited with powers for effecting the
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In the United States, the question of the existence of a public right
to an open trial is primarily a matter of constitutional interpretation;
however, the inquiry cannot be restricted to express terminology. That
the Consitution is silent should not lead to the conclusion that the right
was not intended and therefore should not be recognized. The inquiry
must go far beyond this. It requires an understanding of the evolutionary
process of English constitutional government and the growth of liberty
of Englishmen duringthe process of change from an absolute to a limited
monarchy. The evolution is marked by the transfer of sovereignty to
Parliament beginning with the Magna Charta and the growth of individ-
ual rights as affirmed by the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, the
Petition of Rights, and the Habeas Corpus Act. The result was the
greater participation of the individual in government. These are the
sources of American constitutional law upon which the structure of a
representative democracy has been established;"3 the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution are further events in this evolutionary
process. These sources tell us what, for instance, is embodied in the words
"due process of law."14
The accused's right to a public trial is a part of his broad right to
a fair trial. 5 The public's right to observe trials, on the other hand, is
benevolent designs of social felicity, it is society which must determine whether these
purposes have been realized, or how far they have been departed from." WORTMAN,
TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL INQUIRY AND LIBERTY OF THE PREss (1800), quoted in
SCHROEDER, FREE PRESS ANTHOLOGY 36 (1909).
13. "The wide gap that separated the individual from his government, the great
discrepancy between his political wants and his means for satisfying them and his
passion to make real his aspirations, caused him to think of his rights as man; and thus
was ushered in the age of reason. The idea of natural rights was as explosive in the
sphere of politics as dynamite in the physical world ...
"Reason and conciliation applied to revolutionary individual freedom evolved the
Great Charter, the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Petition of Right and the
Habeas Corpus Act. These great compacts of human rights wrung from unwilling
kings and granted by reluctant Parliaments, are the sources of English and American
constitutional law and are man's priceless heritages. They are the foundations on which
the structure of a representative democracy is builded under a fundamental law which
promulgates the liberties of man and ordains the form of government which protects and
perpetuates his rights." VALE, SOmE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY 533 1941).
14. This is not to infer, however, that the scope of a particular right is to be
restricted by English constitutional history. See note 10 supra. The value of resort
to English constitutional history lies in the understanding to be gained of the political
theory underlying the establishment of a particular form of government.
15. "In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent
dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and state governments
that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall
be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused
cannot be thus (without a public trial) sentenced to prison." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1947).
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based on the right to participate in the governmental process." The prob-
lems growing out of the public's right are, at least in terms of actual
litigation, of recent origin.
During the trial of Minot F. Jelke" on charges of compulsory
prostitution, the trial judge made an order, on his own motion and over
the defendant's objection, excluding the general public and the press
from the courtroom during the presentation of the People's case. The
trial judge stated that "the sound administration of justice and . . .
the interests of good morals" compelled the exclusion. On appeal Jelke
obtained a reversal of his conviction and a new trivl on the ground that
his right to a public trial had been violated."8 In a separate proceeding
the press sought to restrain the trial judge from enforcing his ruling
on the theory that it violated freedom of the press and the right to the
public to attend trials.' 9 In holding against the press, the court of
appeals based its decision on two alternative grounds: (1) the New
York statute does not confer on the public a right to attend trials distinct
from that given to the defendant; and (2) even if the statute were to
be interpreted as granting a right to the public, it is conferred on the
public-at-large and not on any individual member thereof. Since the
16. The rationale to the public right to observe trials is applicable to civil as well
as criminal trials.
17. People v. Jelke, 284 App. Div. 211, 130 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1st Dep't 1954). Counsel
for Pat Ward, the state's principal witness, first made application to have the public
excluded during her testimony. The request was granted and later recalled pending
a hearing. After the arguments were heard the trial judge issued the exclusion order
on his own motion.
18. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954). The conviction was
reversed despite the fact that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of
the jury.
19. United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). In holding
against the press the court explored the possible consequences of a contrary holding. The
court feared that it would deprive an accused of all power to waive his right to a
public trial and thereby prevent him from taking a course which he may believe best
for his own interest. "To deny the right of waiver in such a situation would be 'to
convert a privilege into an imperative requirement' to the disadvantage of the accused"-the
court working on the assumption that the primary function of a public trial to be that of
safeguarding the accused against possible unjust persecution. Id. at 82, 123 N.E. at 781.
Another strange consequence, the court points out, is that the defendant's rights
would be determined in proceedings in which he is not a party and has no voice. A con-
trary holding would also mean that any person denied access to a courtroom, no matter
what the reason, could challenge the court's authority and seek to stay proceedings until
his asserted right to be present had been finally litigated. The court fears that this would
lead to an overwhelming number of collateral proceedings. Id. at 83, 123 N.E. at 782.
These harsh and burdensome consequences of a contrary holding, the court asserts,
afford persuasive evidence that the legislature never intended to confer an enforcible
right of attendance upon every individual member of the public. Ibid.
It is interesting to note that the court did not consider a possible violation of the
First Amendment freedoms.
NOTES
interest is common to the public as a whole, the press lacked the individual
interest which was requisite for standing in court.2
In State of Ohio v. Baker the defendant was being tried on the
charge of pandering. 2' The trial judge, on defendant's motion, excluded
the general public and the press from the courtroom during the cross-
examination of a witness. The defendant's counsel claimed that he
would be "better able to compel the witness to tell the truth" if cross-
examination were conducted in private. In granting the request, and
possibly in answer to the objection made by the press, the trial judge
commented that "if, in the future," a defendant wishes to waive his
right to a public trial and moves for an exclusion, the judge "will deem
it his duty to exercise his discretion, in the interest of a fair and orderly
trial, to consider the extent to which he should exclude members of the
public, including newspapermen," and that he "considers it to be within
his jurisdiction and power to exercise his discretion, if circumstances
warrant, to exclude entirely from his courtroom all members of the
public, including newspapermen.' '22 Aroused by this threat of future
exclusion as well as the present one, the press instituted a separate
proceeding for a writ prohibiting the trial judge from excluding the
press and the general public on the ground that the Ohio Constitution
confers on the public a right to open trials..22  A peremptory writ was
issued against the judge. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the question at issue became moot because the exclusion of spectators
ended before the writ was issued and that the declaration of the judge
as to his future course of conduct under similar circumstances is not
20. The press brought proceedings in the nature of common law prohibition.
Prohibition is usually brought in the name of the state on the theory that where an
inferior court proceeds in excess of its lawful jurisdiction, it is in contempt of the
sovereign, as well as grievance unlawfully imposed on the parties. For this reason courts
are less likely to require the same degree of interest for using mandamus and other
extraordinary remedies. Prohibition may be granted on application of any party or even
a stranger to the record. No personal interest is required to be shown in the proceedings
sought to be prohibited by the relator. For a discussion of the common law extraordinary
legal remedies, see HIGH ExmRAORnszNARY LEGAL REMEDIES, (2d ed. 1884).
21. State of Ohio v. Baker, as reported in E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, - Ohio
App. - , 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955). Since the exclusion was made on defendant's request,
there was no question of violation of his right to a public trial as in the Jelke Case.
22. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, - Ohio St. , , 130 N.E.2d 701, 702
(1955).
23. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, - Ohio App. - , 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
Art. I, § 10, of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of lxw, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.
Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be
provided by law."
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a proper subject of an action in prohibition.24
These cases illustrate the growing clash between two important
constitutional principles-freedom of the press and the right to a fair
trial.2 5 The conflict is between interdependent rights. Fair and impartial
trials are necessary to maintain freedom of the press. Free and
uncensored press is likewise necessary to maintain fair and impartial
trials in our judicial process." Both are attributes of a free society.27
But the right of the press is no greater than the interest of the
public which it represents. The interest protected by the First Amend-
ment is not primarily that of the press to dispense the news but rather
that of the public to acquire it.28  To retain popular sovereignty, the
24. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, - Ohio St. - , 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955). The
holding accords with the common law view. Prohibition is a preventive rather than
a corrective remedy and issues only to prevent the commission of an act; therefore, if
the issuance of the writ would prove unavailing, prohibition did not lie. In this case,
since the exclusion terminated before the writ was issued, prohibition was unavailing.
Prohibition will not be issued for the sole purpose of establishing a principle to govern
other cases in the future. HIGH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 606-07. United States v. Hoff-
man, 4 Wal. 158 (U.S. 1866).
25. See CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow, (1953), particularly, Chapter XI,
dealing with the judicial process.
26. Hays, Let Us Beware of Censorship, 11 BAR BULL. 22 (1953). In the words
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "Without a free press there can be no free society. Freedom
of the press, however, is not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free society ...
The independence of the judiciary is no less a means to the end of free society, and the
proper functioning of an independent judiciary puts the freedom of the press in its
proper perspective." Concurring opinion in Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 334 (1946).
27. "Freedom (in reference to First Amendment freedoms) protects us from those
in power. By and large, worse calamities would result if those in power at the moment
could manage affairs without having their conduct and policies subjected to a thorough-
going review." 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATIONS 40 (1947). Cooley
feels that the purpose of free press is "to guard against repressive measures by the
several departments of the government by means of which persons in power might secure
themselves and favorites from just scrutiny and condemnation. . . . The evils to be
prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government
by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters
as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their
rights as citizens." 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed. 1927).
Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent, observed that "the right of the people to have a free
press is a vital one, but so is the right to have a calm and fair trial free from outside
pressures and influences. Every other right, including the right of a free press itself,
may depend on the ability to get a judicial hearing as dispassionate and impartial as the
weakness inherent in men will permit. I think this publisher passed beyond the legitimate
use of press freedom and infringed the citizen's right to a calm and impartial trial.
I do not think we can say that it is beyond the power of the state to exert safeguards
against such interference with the course of trial as we have here." Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 394 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson seems to recognize that both free press
and fair trial are necessary attributes of a free society. There is a point, however in-
distinct, at which the freedom of the press ends and the duty to observe the defendant's
right to a fair trial begins.
28. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931). This is the so-called Minnesota
Gag Law Case where the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which had the
NOTES
public has a right to know, through personal observation or through other
media, the occurrences that take place in the courtroom.29
As the basis of this right in the public, at least in theory, arises from
the concept of popular sovereignty, it is not to be construed as attaching
to particular individuals but to the public as a whole. Because it lacks
the dignity of an individual right such as the individual's right to personal
security or to property, the method of vindication on foreclosure may
differ from that of the personal right.
The mere fact that the public interest involved in open trials is not
a right in the ordinary acceptation of that word does not justify
subordinating the interest to individual rights."0 When a court decides
that no right to an open trial exists in the public and that the only
concern, whenever an exclusion is attempted, is the promotion of the
effect of suppressing information by providing for injunction against its publication.
Five years after this case, in Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936), the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional as prior restraint upon publication a statute imposing
a license tax on the privilege of engaging in the newspaper business and asserted: "The
predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an un-
trammeled press as a vital source of public information . . . since informed public
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded -by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than
with grave concern."
29. "Freedom of the press, properly conceived, is basic to our constitutional system.
Safeguards for the fair administration of criminal justice are enshrined in our Bill of
Rights. Respect for both of these indispensable elements of our constitutional system
presents some of the most difficult and delicate problems for adjudication when they
are before the court for adjudication. . . . One of the demands of a democratic society
is that the public should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what
happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of criminal
justice is fair and right. On the other hand our society has set apart court and jury as the
tribunal for determining guilt or innocence on the basis of evidence adduced in court,
so far as it is humanly possible." State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338
U.S. 912 (1950).
30. In an organized society consisting of a conglomeration of individual and group
interests, no individual right can be absolute and unbounded. In the nature of things
every private right must be qualified, and an adjustment process must be devised to
define the qualifications. Consider the following quotation: "Man, as with all forms of
life, wants to be free to move and to act, to struggle for satisfactions and seek for
happiness, to strive for ends of purposive achievement and to aspire to higher levels
of commutual relations and human understandings. But his freedom is always conditioned
by the limitations of his own innate powers and is circumscribed by the desires of other
individuals and the interests of the state, to the security and general welfare of which
every need and want of its every member must defer and bend in submissive obedience.
Man may and does crave and formally has avowed his natural and inalienable right to
'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness', but not even life itself has an inherent individual
right to continue. . ..
"Man in truth is without indefeasible rights . . .because, as Harrington suggested
and Locke concluded, the group-state through its government must survive, must achieve
its foundation purpose of order through law and must advance its social ends through
definitions of human rights and the consequent control of the sphere of individual power
and action." VALE, op. cit. supra note'11, at 478-79.
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defendant's right to a fair trial,"1 it unduly minimizes the complexity of
the issue involved by ignoring pre-constitutional history. In the final
analysis, an adjustment must be made between the rights and interests
in conflict, whether between the defendant's right to a fair trial and
the right of the press and the public in acquiring knowledge of the
happenings in court or between the defendant's right and that of a
particular witness whose personal safety or reputation may be in danger.32
The process of weighing the various interests in the determination of
the propriety and the scope of any exclusion seems properly a part of the
trial judge's discretionary powers, for no standards can be set up to
cover the infinite number of circumstances in which the problem may
arise. Any attempt to set up categories by legislation might lead to a
mechanical resolution of the problem which may prove to be a hindrance
rather than an aid to the administration of criminal justice.33
It would be meaningless to recognize a right in the public if it had
no means of vindicating it.34 The Jelke case shows that where the right
of an accused to a public trial is improperly foreclosed, his remedy lies
in requesting a new trial.3" The remedy for improper foreclosure of
the public's right is not as easily stated, for the public and the press
are not direct parties in a criminal proceeding. The New York court
stated that even if a right were recognized in the public it would not
31. This is the theory upon which numerous American cases are based. See, for
example, Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); State v. Callahan,
100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907).
32. For instances where courts have excluded the public out of special regard for
the interest of a witness, see Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 A. 53 (1918) ;
Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505,
180 S.W.2d 423 (1944) ; Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935) : State v.
Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907). For the interest of the accused see Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 861 (1923). For protection of public morals see State v. Croak,
167 La. 92, 118 So. 703 (1928) ; State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 609, 144 P. 784 (1914).
Statutes of several states provide for exclusion of the public in prosecutions for
rape, adultery, sodomy, fornication and divorce and juvenile proceedings. For a collection
of these statutes see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 338-343.
33. Legislation providing for closed proceedings in juvenile court cases may be
considered as an attempt by the legislature to set up categories. The balancing of interests
is done by the legislature, and the welfare of the child is determined to be the overriding
interest to be protected. The assumption seems to be that the juvenile's interest will be
better protected in a closed trial. In contrast is the trial of adults where the presumption
is reversed. As in the cases of an adult, if the circumstances show that the presumption
is not valid for the particular case, it seems that the juvenile should be given the opportu-
nity of being heard in open proceedings. The legislative determination should not be
held conclusive of the matter.
34. It is a familiar legal principle that "if a person has a right, he must of necessity
have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise
or enjoyment of it." This is the doctrine of ubi jus ibi reinediumn. "It is a vain thing to
imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right, and want of remedy are reciprocal."
DICEY, PARTIES TO AN ACTION (1886).
35. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
be 'an enforcible one for the right belongs to the public as a whole; the
individual interest which is requisite for standing in court is lacking."
The rationale appears to be that the prosecutor defends the public interest,
and the public or the press has no right to intervene in the criminal
proceedings. Any remedy to the public, where the prosecutor fails to
assert the public interest, must be through the political process. The
public's right, however, is based on the Constitution and deserves more
effective means of vindication. Members of the public should at least be
permitted to adjudicate the public interest through extraordinary
proceedings in mandamus and prohibition. But this approach is not
without difficulties."-
The Ohio case illustrates that even if the public right is recognized
as attaching to individuals or groups such as the press, prohibition is
unavailing where the exclusion has terminated." If the trial is in progress
and the exclusion order is in operation when the writ is issued, then
prohibition is effective to the extent that it keeps the trial open for
public observation for the remainder of the proceedings. Its effectiveness
depends on the speed with which the writ can be obtained; full
effectiveness is an impossibility unless the proceedings can be stopped
as soon as the order of exclusion 'is issued by the trial judge.
Where prohibition will prove unavailing, mandamus may be used
effectively in a narrow area. The object of mandamus is to compel
action where there is inaction rather than to prohibit action; therefore,
it may be invoked where there is inaction on the part of the trial judge
in the course of his issuance of the exclusion order. This inaction
may be found in the trial judge's refusal to exercise his discretion in
making the ruling or in his refusal to hold a hearing as an aid to the
exercise of his discretion. For example, if the trial judge orders an
exclusion, on motion by the defendant, without a hearing, on the ground
that he has no discretion in the matter, mandamus may lie to compel him
to hold a hearing or to exercise his discretionary powers. This will
not insure an open trial, but, by forcing the trial judge to deliberate on
36. United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. at 84, 123 N.E.2d at 783.
37. Rigid rules were set up by the early common law courts in the application of
the extraordinary writs. The tendency, however, has been toward flexibility in pro-
cedural rules by looking to the purpose underlying the remedy. See, e.g., Quimbo Appo
v. The People, 20 N.Y. 531 (1860); North Bloomfield G.M. Co. v. Keyser, 58 Cal.
315 (1881). Flexibility has also been achieved through the use of legal fictions. By this
method the essence of a given rule is changed while homage is paid to the letter. By
the use of either method common law prohibition and mandamus may be employed.
Whether they are effective remedies is another problem.
38. E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, - Ohio St. - , 130 N.E.2d at 703.
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the question, it will tend to infuse responsibility in the judicial process.39
Where a hearing is held before an order of exclusion is issued,
another method by which the press or other members of the public can
assert their right is to appear, by leave of court, as amicus curiae."0
Although it lies within the discretion of the court to accept the advice
of amicws curiae, their appearance will serve to place the intervener's
position into the "hopper" of arguments to be considered by the trial
judge in the weighing process before exercising his discretion in the
matter.
The fact that the courts have only recently found it necessary to
include the press within the scope of exclusionary orders seems
significant.4 ' The impact of "trial by newspaper" on the accused's right
to a fair trial coupled with the courts' inability to use the contempt
power to curb press abuses may be the reason for this resort to
exclusion.4 2  "Trial by newspaper" is undesirable because it prejudices
39. For a discussion of the origin and nature of the common law writ of mandamus,
see HIGH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 4-37.
40. That this was allowed in early common law practice is indicated in the statement
of Sir John Hawles made in 1690 when commenting on Cornish's trial. "The reason that
all matters of law are, or ought to be, transacted publicly is that any person, unconcerned
as well as concerned, may as 'amicus curiae' inform the Court better, if he thinks they are
in error, that justice may be done; and the reason that all trials are public is that any
person may inform in point of fact, though not subpoena'd, that truth may be discovered,
in civil as well as in criminal cases. There is an invitation, to all persons who can inform
the Court concerning the matter to be tried, to come into the Court, and they shall be
heard."
41. Not until United Press Ass'n v. Valente, was the question of the public's right
to a public trial been squarely litigated.
42. The best method of protecting the accused from the prejudicial effect of
"trial by newspaper" has been of great concern. In England, such publicity is effectively
curbed by free use of the contempt power. See Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF
COURT (1927) ; Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARv.
L.R. 885 (1935) ; Note, Free Speech 'vs. The Fair Trial in. the English and American
Law of Contempt by Publication, 17 U. OF CHI. L. R. 540 (1950). See also Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 921-36 (1950).
In the United States major limitations have been placed upon the courts' power to
punish summarily for contempt. So far as the federal courts are concerned, the "in or
near" doctrine, interpreted as geographical, physical nearness, effectively bars the
traditional contempt for publication proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 401; Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941). Mr. Justice Jackson stated in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50
(1950) : "This court has gone a long way to disable a trial judge from dealing with press
interference with the trial practices." Judge Magruder of the First Circuit asserts:
"More fundamentally, it has been thought that this modern phenomenon of 'trial by
newspaper' is protected to a considerable degree by the constitutional right of freedom
of the press. . . . On this view there has been some fatalistic acceptance of 'trial by
newspaper,' however unfortunate, 'as an unavoidable curse of metropolitan living (like, I
suppose, crowded subways).'" Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1952). Judge
Magruder, of course, was referring to Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) ; and Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
As to the state courts, they are effectively limited by the "clear and present danger"
doctrine which gives the Supreme Court power to review convictions of state courts to
NOTES
the minds of the jurors, thus preventing the fair administration of
criminal justice. It potentially reverses the presumption of innocence
to one of guilt. The effectiveness of the exclusionary order as a remedy
for press abuses is, however, open to doubt. Exclusion may tend to
preserve the presumption of innocence to a degree, but it fails to
counteract the evil of "trial by newspaper" which arises in many cases
before the trial begins. The order tends to punish the innocent, for
all newspapers are not guilty of this vice in the sensational cases. Thus
while the exclusion protects the accused's right to a fair trial, it may
unnecessarily encroach on freedom of the press and the public right
to know and participate in the governmental process. At the present
time, only through the weighing process and a liberal policy towards
intervention as amicus curiae by representative members of the public,
where rights are threatened to be foreclosed, can the public's right to
know be protected against arbitrary restriction.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
VS. JOB SECURITY
Recent congressional hearings1 have focused attention on the grow-
ing problems wrought by technological changes 2 and consequent displace-
ment. Because its purpose is to increase productivity and profits by
reduced labor costs,' technological change is opposed by some fearful
determine whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right. Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). "The courts are then limited to doing what they can
lo insulate jurors from the prejudicial effect of such publicity, as by cautionary instruc-
tions or by the granting of continuances, or in some cases granting a change of venue."
Delaney v. United States, supra, at 113. The courts have, perhaps, found in exclusion
an effective deterrent to "trial by newspaper."
1. H.R. REs. 221, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). "Resolution creating a select com-
mittee to conduct an investigation and study of the effects of increasing automation
upon the American economy." 101 CoNG. REc. 4180 (daily ed. April 21, 1955). The
committee held hearings in October 1955 at which representatives of management and
labor testified.
2. Technological change is used in a broad sense and in this note and means the
use of labor saving devices and all types of modem manufacturing methods. These
methods include automation, mechanization, and improved operational and organizational
techniques. The discussion is chiefly related to the mass production manufacturing plants.
3. "The Annual Improvement Factor . . . recognizes that a continuing improve-
ment in the standard of living of employees depends upon technological progress, better
tools, methods, processes, and equipment, and a cooperative attitude on the part of all
parties in such progress. It further recognizes the principle that to produce more with
the same amount of human effort is a sound economic and social objective." 5 CCH
LAB. L. RE:P. (4th ed.) ff 59923.095 (1955) (Ford Motor Co.-UAW Contract).
